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THE STATUS-PRODUCTION SIDESHOW: WHY THE
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS ARE STILL A MISTAKE
Richard A. Epstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
The civil rights movement today is beset by frustration, failure,
and division. This categorical statement is not meant to draw atten-
tion to the day-to-day troubles that might embarrass any large-scale
social or political movement. Take, for example, the position of the
NAACP.' The recent dismissal of its executive director, Benjamin
Chavis, was no doubt attributable in part to his settlement of Mary
Stansel's lawsuit for sexual harassment and to the large financial defi-
cits that accumulated under his administration. 2 And his dismissal
surely had to do with his policies to radicalize what had become a
stolid, mainstream organization. But the long-term difficulties of the
NAACP (as with other civil rights organizations) surely cut deeper
than this. The policies of the NAACP worked best when targeted at
the obvious evils of Jim Crow and segregation.3 These policies do not
work well in the more complex and intractable disputes that are the
hallmark of the last generation. No amount of agreement on the evils
of Jim Crow can conceal the strong levels of disagreement about
whether to pursue a policy of affirmative action and if so in what
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
Isaac Barchas provided his usual insightful research assistance.
1 For a full account that makes this diagnosis of the situation but offers solutions that are at
variance with my own, see Benjamin Wittes, End of the Rainbow, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 26, 1994,
at 13.
2 See Sylvester Monroe, After the Revolution, TIME, Aug. 29, 1994, at 40. Benjamin Chavis
was succeeded at the NAACP by Dr. William F. Gibson. The NAACP subsequently ousted Gib-
son and elected Myrlie Evers-Williams as the organization's chair. Gibson was criticized for "lav-
ish spending" and allegedly misappropriating NAACP funds for himself. Steven A. Holmes,
Gibson Ousted As the Leader of N.A.A.C.P., N.Y. TnMEs, Feb. i9, 1995, at Ai, A3 5.
3 As one commentator noted:
At bottom, the NAACP never progressed beyond the era when race issues were simple
matters of civil rights. During the ig5os and '6os, the organization helped design and
carry out a strategy of mass action, protests, lobbying and marches to destroy segregation.
This strategy, based on the stark, morally unambiguous reality of racial oppression, re-
flected a view of local government as the instrument of civil rights abuse and the federal
government as its remedy. The approach targeted legalized segregation, and Jim Crow
melted in a decade, but it translated poorly into the next era.
Wittes, supra note I, at 14. The same sentiment is expressed in Monroe's article: "Of what use is
the N.A.A.C.P. - or any other traditional black civil-rights organizations - now that most legal
barriers to housing, education and the political arena have been removed?" Monroe, supra note 2,
at 40.
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fashion.4 Universal agreement on the right of all Americans to vote
regardless of color offers little guidance on the issue whether districts
should be shaped in order to maximize the number of black represent-
atives in Congress or in state legislatures.5 Widespread agreement on
the evils of employment discrimination provides no obvious answer to
the question how to increase the wages of black workers or indeed of
workers generally. 6 Even the simple expedient of expanding legal
remedies in discrimination cases has lost some of its obvious appeal: as
the number of protected classes (sex, age, and disability) expands, the
available resources to process claims in a sensible and orderly fashion
diminish under the crushing administrative burdens. The backlog of
unresolved cases increased from 49,000 to 73,000 during 1994 alone.7
No longer is there any clear theme that easily allows individuals from
different racial groups or walks of life to come together in pursuit of a
common goal. There is no one civil rights movement anymore. The
once-unified movement has fragmented into a bewildering array of
specific pieces, each with its own distinctive focus on age, sex, race,
disability, religion, or sexual orientation. Each of these organizations
looks and acts more like a traditional special interest group and less
like the vanguard of a universal moral movement capable of van-
quishing all its foes with the loftiness of its purpose.
4 See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, Racial Discrimination or Righting Past Wrongs?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 1994, at B8 (discussing Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1994), the lawsuit that
challenged the affirmative action programs at the University of Texas).
5 See Abigail Thermstrom, Redistricting, in Black and White; By Any Name, It's a Quota,
N.Y. TMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at A23.
6 See, e.g., James Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment Discrim-
ination Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 276, 297-98 (iggo). For a more
recent overview of the wage question, see Sylvia Nasar, Statistics Reveal Bulk of New Jobs Pay
over Average, N.Y. Tnmas, Oct. 17, 1994, at Ai. The long-term trends are decidedly more prob-
lematic than the title of the piece suggests. Nasar observes that "there is evidence that hourly pay
of at least the bottom half of the work force - those at the midpoint or below - continues to
slip." Id. at D4 . Black workers tend to be more heavily represented in this segment of the
workforce. In addition, average real compensation increased by only 3.5% during the first half of
the I9gos, compared with increases of nearly 30% for the entire ig6os and of nearly x5% for the
entire 197os. See id. And for what it is worth, the position of white males in the workforce has
deteriorated as of late as well. In the 197os, about 8o% of men between the ages of 22 and 58
were full time in the labor force; by the x98os that figure had dropped nine percentage points, at
the same time that female participation in the labor force increased. See Sylvia Nasar, More Men
in Prime of Life Spend Less Time Working, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, i994, at Ai.
7 See Peter T. Kilborn, Backlog of Cases is Overwhelming Jobs-Bias Agency, N.Y. TiMES,
Nov. 26, 1994, at Ai. The article notes that many workers give up their complaints, because it
now takes i9 months for an investigation; some individuals decide to initiate private suits after
waiting the required six months before obtaining "right to sue" letters from the EEOC. See id. at
Ai, Aro. The article also notes that the EEOC is now reviewing its established policy, which
favors the pursuit of individual grievances while avoiding the large class action lawsuits that rely
heavily on statistical proof of disparate impact. Democrats have tended to favor the latter strat-
egy; Republicans the former. See id. at Axo.
io86 [Vol. io8:ro85
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The present disarray in the civil rights movement has led to a
strong sense of nostalgia for the victories of the past generation. The
civil rights agenda of the 1940s, 195Os, and perhaps even the ig6os
was clear and decisive: open up the polls to all voters; desegregate the
schools; remove the ban on interracial marriage; curb private violence;
end racial hatreds and divisions; and dismantle the entire apparatus of
Jim Crow that dominated the South and stained the image of the na-
tion as a whole.8 The totalitarian nature of the established institutions
was plain for all to see; the strained efforts to justify Jim Crow laws
and practices were grotesquely false. The use of public force and pri-
vate initiative to overcome this entrenched set of social institutions is
one of the great moral and political achievements of the twentieth cen-
tury. It is natural, therefore, that people who have difficulty making
sense of the current social landscape are drawn to refighting the war
against Jim Crow.
Richard McAdams's Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination9 is one of several
recent papers that seek to justify the present operation of the civil
rights laws with a backward-looking glance at the Jim Crow regime
that dominated the South before 1964.10 But although McAdams
gazes backward, his mission is forward-looking. I have taken the posi-
tion that all civil rights laws that regulate behavior in private, compet-
itive employment markets should be repealed." McAdams seeks to
show that the full panoply of civil rights laws may be justified in a
contemporary setting. He employs a novel set of arguments that
would hardly have occurred to the original defenders of that legisla-
tion, who needed no subtle refinements to counter what they regarded
as obvious injustices. McAdams's Article also has the broader purpose
of employing the tools of law and economics, with their ostensibly con-
servative bias, for a decidedly liberal purpose. As applied to questions
of race relations, he hopes to show that antidiscrimination laws may
8 For a discussion of the relevant issues, see HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA:
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL PoLicY, 1960-1972, at 3-5 (199o); ANDREW KULL,
THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 1-6 (1992); MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RA-
CIAL DIscRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT I-8 (1966); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CA-
REER OF JIM CROW i-O (3rd rev. ed. 1974).
9 Richard H. MeAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Produc-
tion and Race Discrimination, io8 HARV. L. REV. ioo3 (1995).
10 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 220-34 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,
92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2434-36 (1994).
11 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIs-
CRIMINATION LAWS 9 (1992). McAdams is quite critical of my views on this subject and attacked
them extensively in Richard H. McAdams, Epstein on His Oum Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
241, 241-42 (1994). For my rejoinder, see Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden
Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. I, 5-Io, 13, 46-48 (1994).
1995] IO8 7
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be justified even under the standard efficiency criterion of the law and
economics movement.
McAdams undertakes no modest task when he seeks to show that
the dynamics of group behavior explain why the civil rights laws re-
tain their importance even in social conditions vastly different from
those that pertained before 1964. His stated purpose is to make clear
how private actors adopt hiring strategies without coercion that yield
the unfortunate social outcomes that a well-crafted antidiscrimination
law could prevent. In examining the soundness of this proposition, I
exclude from consideration any unfortunate outcomes that are a result
of the public or private use of force, deception, or even monopoly
power. These practices involve different forms of coercion, all con-
demned under standard theories of tort or antitrust law, so there is
little that is novel or surprising in a claim that a party endowed with
these powers could bring about antisocial consequences. Nor do I
think that it is particularly interesting to show that various techniques
of social reinforcement can increase the effectiveness of coercive tactics
so defined. Of course they can. The challenging task that McAdams
has set for himself is to show that the ability to use status-production
techniques has similar untoward consequences when these coercive
factors are absent from the picture. One might think that this task
would call for a close examination of employment practices in the
post-1964 world in which diversity is a buzzword and affirmative ac-
tion a common practice. The object of that inquiry would be to show
that, beneath this pleasant veneer, covert practices, some corrupt and
some unconscious, help to preserve an unacceptable pattern of racial
discrimination.
Alternatively, McAdams could give a close examination of the de-
terminants of wages and success. He might seek to show, for example,
that blacks who have test scores equal to those of whites do not fare
as well in the job market as do whites. Yet the evidence on the corre-
lation between race and success in the job market is difficult to collect
and to interpret. Initially, any investigator has to ask how pervasive
programs for diversity and affirmative action could coexist with wide-
spread covert patterns of discrimination in workplaces. Simple testi-
mony that African-American workers believe themselves to be subject
to discrimination is hardly dispositive on the question. The effort,
therefore, to bolster these institutions must turn to some extent on
complex statistical determinations that themselves defy easy interpreta-
tion. However, at least some of the evidence points in a direction that
is inconsistent with the view that current labor markets pervasively
discriminate against black workers. At least one suggestive (although
highly controversial) study indicates that, for any given level of prereq-
uisites and qualifications, black workers today fare better in the em-
1088 [Vol. io8:1o85
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ployment derby than do white workers.' 2 And another, more
econometrically minded study attributes much of the wage gap be-
tween black and white workers to their levels of education prior to
entry into the work force.' 3 The question whether there is discrimina-
tion in contemporary labor markets has to be regarded as an empirical
question on matters of direction as well as of extent. McAdams treats
pervasive forms of employment discrimination as though the proposi-
tion were a self-evident truth.
McAdams does not approach matters in this straightforward fash-
ion, however. Instead he veers off into a discussion of two distinct
institutions, neither of which bears a close relationship to the topic at
hand. First, he offers military parallels and analogies. Thus he starts
with the famous speech of Henry V ("We few, we happy few . . 2)
delivered to rally his troops before the battle of Agincourt; he then
makes numerous references to the role of morale in military settings.
Yet Henry's is no ordinary speech; his psychological ploy is to invite
his men to leave although he knows that they must decline his invita-
tion. But by the same token, the speech rings true for less heroic set-
tings as well, because military cohesion is critical in all combat
settings, even when the odds are not as skewed as they were at
Agincourt.
More to my point, it is a very chancy business to analogize from
military arrangements to other social systems, much less employment
markets. Even the most casual observer instinctively recognizes that
the military is a total institution - that is, one that seeks comprehen-
12 See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE iN AMERICAN LIFE 488-92 (1994). Herrnstein and Murray's data may be
summarized as follows: with IQ held constant, in 19go, the likelihood that a black person would
reach a given professional level is about 1.7 times the likelihood of a white person. See id. at 491.
Parity between whites and blacks was achieved just prior to passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
See id. at 490 tbl. The disparity index rose rapidly in the four years that preceded the statute,
leveled off at slightly more than i.o in the period between i96S and i97o, and spurted again after
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (197i), which made disparate impact and business neces-
sity tests part of the working vocabulary of the civil rights law. See HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY,
supra, at 49o. The index for clerical work reached r.o only after the 1964 Act and has never been
as favorable for blacks as that for professional work, which lends some support for the proposi-
tion that the civil rights laws tend to do more for upper-class blacks than for lower-class blacks.
See id. Herrnstein and Murray's work might be questioned to the extent that it measures job
success conditioned on IQ. Their findings would be strengthened, however, if black success in
labor markets based on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, college boards, or other standardized
tests showed the same result.
13 See Derek A. Neal & William R. Johnson, The Role of Pre-Market Factors in Black-White
Wage Differences 3 (Nov. 21, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) ("While we find some evidence of labor market discrimination, we conclude that
the disadvantages young black workers now face in the labor market arise mostly from the obsta-
cles they faced as children in acquiring productive human capital. Our analysis suggests that
public policy focus on the plight of black children in acquiring skills valued by the labor
market.").
io891995]
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sive regulation of the life of those who participate in it.14 As such, the
military differs in important ways from ordinary employment markets,
which respect spheres of worker privacy. Employment in the military
is not at will, and soldiers are not allowed to join unions or to strike
in the heat of battle. Although the ordinary employer will rarely re-
cover damages and can never get specific performance when a soldier
is in breach, the sovereign employer has a full arsenal of punishments,
including death for desertion, that can be directed at the hapless sol-
dier who violates the applicable legal norm. Matters of morale, impor-
tant in all employment contexts, are a matter of life and death in the
military. We may look with envy on the military's success in combat-
ting racial discrimination, but we can hardly treat the military as a
model from which we can draw powerful lessons about the operation
of the competitive market.
Second, McAdams undertakes a close study of practices under Jim
Crow, which like the military is a total institution, but which unlike
the military has clearly totalitarian overtones. In that context his ob-
ject is to offer a warning of how contemporary labor markets might
operate if left unregulated by the civil rights laws. But Jim Crow is
an odd focal point if the goal is to justify current antidiscrimination
laws in political and social settings that are light years removed from
the segregated South.15
Notwithstanding the evident limitations of his examples, McAdams
proceeds in two stages to demonstrate why market discrimination -
he largely limits himself to discrimination against blacks - should be
countered by a vigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. First,
by way of background, he draws on the rich literature from game the-
ory to show that cooperation between individuals can often be im-
proved by social norms and practices that use group membership and
affiliation. One part of that strategy is to build up the individual self-
esteem of group members, often by reducing the relative status of
members of rival groups. 16 Next, he applies this theory to race rela-
tions to show that the dominant white group historically has -seized
upon such practices to create a solidarity that has worked against the
interest of excluded groups.' 7 He claims that these unfortunate out-
comes can only be countered by an effective antidiscrimination law
that roots out these practices.' In his view the status-production
function of discrimination exerts so powerful an influence that it alone
14 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, On the Characteristics of Total Institutions, in ASYLUMS,
ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES I, 1-14 (xg6x)
(describing the characteristics of total institutions).
Is For an account of the coercive behavior even in the absence of formal laws that mandate
segregation in employment, see Epstein, cited above in note ii, at 38-45.
16 See McAdams, supra note 9, at pp. 1021-23.
17 See id. at pp. 1049-53.
18 See id. at pp. 1074-83.
[Vol. 108:10851o9o
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is sufficient to maintain destructive racist practices long after the dis-
mantling of the formal apparatus of Jim Crow. In the end he con-
cludes, more cautiously than one might suppose, that the question
whether civil rights laws should be retained is an empirical question
that depends on whether the benefits outweigh the costs. 19 But he
claims that even this modest conclusion is in sharp conflict with my
insistence on total repeal, a position that he asserts rests on some
naive hope that competitive market institutions already achieve a
proper social result.
20
This brief response to McAdams tracks his two-part analysis. I
shall begin by examining his general theory of human behavior. My
point is not to deny the role that positive enforcement has in the gov-
ernance of human behavior. Quite the opposite, knowing how infor-
mal norms work is critical to understanding all sorts of social
arrangements, including employment contracts. 2 1 But no fascination
with positive methods of social reinforcement should blind us to the
equally obvious point that these devices are most effective when used
in tandem with coercive devices - including legal sanctions or threats
of physical force - that are directed toward the same end.
My review of McAdams's general theory makes it possible to cri-
tique his view of race relations, both in the employment context and
elsewhere. It is here that the shortcomings of the theory are most ap-
parent. Individual and group interactions are an important part of
social life, and status production is surely one activity in which all
individuals engage. But there is no payoff to McAdams's proposed
marriage between the status production function of social groups and
his defense of the civil rights laws.
His chief mistakes are two. First, although he recognizes that all
groups can resort to status-production techniques, he underestimates
the effectiveness of these techniques as a counterweight to the activi-
ties of any dominant political group. As long as all parties have access
to the same techniques, no one faction can maintain anything close to
a monopoly-like position. A faction itself is not a monolith but a
group of separate firms, and as with any ordinary business cartel,
some members will defect from the dominant coalition if the economic
opportunities present themselves. Meanwhile, outside a dominant coa-
lition, other firms can happily expand their production even if the car-
tel holds firm. So even if one assumed (falsely) that ninety percent of
the resources were in the hands of a dominant faction, that faction
could maintain neither its cohesion nor its market share against the
prospect of new entry. Having overestimated the stability of cartels,
19 See id. at p. 1082.
20 See, e.g., id. at 1074-78.
21 See EPsrEIN, supra note ii, at 147-58 (describing the importance of informal enforcement
mechanisms that pertain to contracts at will).
HeinOnline  -- 108 Harv. L. Rev 1091 1994-1995
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
McAdams then wrongly concludes that status production obviates the
need for dominant groups to resort to public force and/or private vio-
lence to achieve their own political ends. The vital corrective role of
new entrants into established markets is a point with more than theo-
retical interest. At the concrete level, the history of Jim Crow is
squarely against him, as is much of the history of the civil rights
movement itself. Coercion is always the main event; status production
is the sideshow. 22 The key social task is to minimize the level of pub-
lic force in human affairs, which only the repeal and not the enforce-
ment of the civil rights laws can achieve.
I1. SOCIAL COOPERATION AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
McAdams begins with the important truth that the standard indi-
vidualistic explanations of human behavior do not account for the
high level of cooperation observed between unrelated persons in vari-
ous social settings. 23 The economist's paradigmatic illustration of non-
cooperative individual behavior is the so-called prisoner's dilemma, in
which each party in a social situation tends to defect from a mutually
advantageous cooperative solution in search of private advantage.
The irony is that these self-interested strategies lead to results that, in
the end, are destructive to the aggregated interests of both players.
Universal cooperation beats universal defection, so only the inability of
the parties to coordinate their behavior from the outset induces them
separately to take steps that lead to their common ruin. A standard
argument for contractual obligations and for legislative intervention is
that they tend to curb these destructive tendencies. Contracts allow
individuals to take steps that would otherwise be privately costly by
offering them remedies against breaches from the other side.2 4 And
when contracts cannot be formed because of high transaction costs,
the imposition of reciprocal obligations by legislation can provide simi-
lar forms of assurance. People will no longer fear their being unable
to drill as they please for oil in a common pool, or cast their nets wide
for fish, because they know that their rivals are also constrained by
law from pumping out all the oil or capturing all the fish. The system
of common restraints improves the outcome for all parties.
McAdams stresses the familiar point that the stark prisoner's di-
lemma model cannot satisfactorily explain why people do in fact coop-
erate with each other when they face no sanctions for defection.
McAdams makes the correct and sensible point that the informal
mechanisms of social practice, influence, and control usually counter
22 For a general philosophical treatment of the multiple meanings of coercion, see ALAN
WERTHEIMER, COERCION 3-15 (1987). For my extended treatment of the many meanings of coer-
cion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 39-74 (1993).
23 See McAdams, supra note 9, at pp. 1009-13.
24 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 3.9, 4.1 (4th ed. 1992).
[Vol. Io8:io8g1092
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any private tendency to defect. McAdams notes, for example, that vir-
tually all military operations have to rely on a spirit of affection, coop-
eration, and self-sacrifice. It may be in the interest of any single
soldier to pick up and run, but if all soldiers followed that course of
action, each would face a far greater risk of being killed, and the
larger military objectives of the nation would be lost. Morale is criti-
cal to the effectiveness of any military force, which is why military
training emphasizes team sports, cooperative action, and personal trust
to create a general ethos of cooperation strong enough to survive the
rigors of combat.
The importance of these social ties in human behavior is a theme
that has not been ignored in the prior literature. Gary Becker, whose
work on discrimination is much cited and discussed by McAdams, is
also the author of a paper entitled A Theory of Social Interactions,
which seeks to explain how people behave when they perceive their
well-being to be dependent on the well-being of others.2 5 Likewise, I
have stressed the same theme in a paper called Altruism: Universal
and Selective, in which I argue that altruism is directed toward spe-
cific individuals, but not toward all individuals. 26 For our purposes,
the refinements in the arguments matter less than one central observa-
tion: when people take into account the welfare of others in making
decisions, they are less likely to act in a strictly egotistical fashion, less
likely to contemplate defection from cooperative social solutions, and
less likely to turn against those for whom they have a biological or
social affinity. Any hurt one inflicts on these select people is also in
part a form of self-inflicted harm. The point that comes through loud
and clear in McAdams's paper is that altruism is usually selective, so
that only some individuals are in the preferred class. The antisocial
tendencies directed toward outsiders, therefore, are likely to increase,
for now inflicting a harm on a known outsider is justified not only by
the benefits that it brings to the actor, but also by the benefits that it
brings to the larger class with which the actor identifies. Such is often
the sordid logic of ethnic conflict, be it in Rwanda or in Bosnia. That
same logic also applies to the old South, where ties of race and society
were both strong.
There is no question, then, that models premised on narrowly self-
interested behavior do not fit with either the biological or social facts
of human nature. Yet before one waxes too eloquently about the im-
portance of noncoercive and nonpecuniary motivators such as altruism
and status, one should recognize that the effective formation of group
identity depends not only on the carrots of inspiration and coopera-
2S See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1o63, io64-66,
1090-91 (1974).
26 See Richard A. Epstein, Altruism: Universal and Selective, 67 Soc. SERV. REV. 388, 390-92
(1993).
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tion, but also on the sticks of discipline and force. Military success
does not depend solely on a spirit of camaraderie and honors for those
who have fallen in battle. Harsh sanctions, including death, are im-
posed for desertion from the field of battle, for disobedience to the
lawful commands of superior officers, and for collaboration with the
enemy.27 Similarly, the firm that pays handsome bonuses for excellent
performance also jealously guards its right to fire individuals who
slack off in production and to punish criminally individuals who are
caught taking money from the till.
Techniques of both positive and negative reinforcement are used
simultaneously, because the economic principle of diminishing margi-
nal returns applies to carrots as well as to sticks. Although one carrot
may work wonders to boost morale, a second carrot may not work as
well. At some point the problems of social organization will be far
better addressed by the addition of the first stick instead of the twenti-
eth carrot.28 No social organization shuns the use of positive rein-
forcement to obtain support. By the same token, all institutions must
have some negative reinforcement to succeed. The problem institu-
tions face is finding the optimal mix between the two; only rarely will
an institution rely exclusively on positive reinforcement.
m1. RAcIAL DIsCRIMINATION AS A FORm OF SOCIAL COOPERATION
A. Three Models of Discrimination: Becker, McAdams, Epstein
The first part of McAdams's thesis pays little attention to race per
se, and rather lays out his analytical principles. The second part, how-
ever, purports to apply these general principles of social cooperation to
the problem of racial discrimination. To make his case, McAdams de-
27 Soldiers can be punished for providing the enemy with any information beyond their name,
rank, and serial number. See, e.g., United States v. Fleming, 7 C.M.A. 543, 549-54, 562 (1957), 23
C.M.R. 7, 11-1S, 26 (affirming a soldier's sentence of life imprisonment for making communist
propaganda recordings while held as a prisoner of war in Korea, despite the defendant's claims of
coercion and distress).
28 A "coercive" ability to impose sanctions that reduce the utility of those who disobey the
collective norms calls attention to the dual meanings associated with the term coercion. In one
sense coercion only refers to techniques that are used to make other persons worse off in order to
achieve some collateral end. Thus, a refusal to sell at $r.oo could be regarded as coercive if the
end is to elicit an offer of $2.oo. But coercion in this sense only refers to the intention to make
someone else worse off. It does not carry with it the implication that the coercion involved should
be stopped by the state. Otherwise neither seller nor buyer could bargain over price without
running afoul of the legal rule, because both parties have used coercive behavior.
The second meaning of coercion involves far more than taking steps that diminish the satisfac-
tion of another individual. The means are critical to this definition: force or the refusal to per-
form a preexisting obligation are the cardinal cases. A prohibition against these forms of coercion
is sensible, because a system of bargaining works better if coercion in this strong sense is prohib-
ited, even if coercion in the first sense to reach a contract price is routinely allowed. The interme-
diate case is that of hard bargaining by someone in a monopoly position, when some constraints
on the process should be allowed.
[Vol. io8:io851094
HeinOnline  -- 108 Harv. L. Rev 1094 1994-1995
STATUS-PRODUCTION SIDESHOW
velops the contrast between Gary Becker's associational model of dis-
crimination and his own status-production model of discrimination.
According to McAdams, the associational model posits that "people
who discriminate act as if they have a 'taste' for avoiding contact or
association with members of other races."29 Discrimination, in this
view, turns on private likes and dislikes.
McAdams's alternative status model posits that the gains from dis-
crimination lie not in the avoidance of association but in the exploita-
tion of associations that inflict status losses on other groups to improve
one's own self-esteem. His evidence comes from a variety of sources.
Blacks were often hired in the segregated South to do domestic ser-
vice, where they were in intimate association with the women and
children of the household; white men (but not women) had sexual liai-
sons with black women, both by force and by stealth; and, most in-
structively, antimiscegenation laws prohibited lawful marriages
between whites and blacks. These laws were not needed or intended
to protect those whites who did not wish to marry blacks; rather "[t]he
purpose was to prevent other whites from entering into such associa-
tions"30 to preserve the relative status differential between blacks and
whites. For McAdams the lesson is that self-esteem feeds off of dis-
crimination, so that "race discrimination may persist in the face of
market competition [and that] race discrimination represents a market
failure . . . that may justify coercive restraint of private status
'confiscation'." 3
'
It is important to disentangle fact from fancy in this portion of
McAdams's analysis. First, according to Becker's theory of discrimi-
nation, we should not expect to see any complete separation between
the races in ordinary employment settings.32 McAdams's reference to
"avoiding contact or association"33 makes it appear as though, accord-
ing to the orthodox theory, separation were the final inevitable out-
growth of the system. In practice, however, different wages may be
paid in integrated contexts as long as members of one group affirma-
tively want to work with members of the other group, who in turn
would rather not work with the first group. Becker's point is that the
market advantage lies with the victim of discrimination because,
29 McAdams, supra note 9, at pp. 1033-34 (quoting GARY BECKER, THE EcoNoMIcs OF Dis-
CRIMINATION 6 (2d ed. 1971)) ("If an individual has a 'taste for discrimination,' he must act as if
he were willing to pay something, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associ-
ated with some persons instead of others.").
To the extent that the preferences of those who discriminate are only "as if" preferences, they
should be easily correctable. McAdams's position takes on more credibility when the point is
made descriptive and not hypothetical - that is, to say that people do discriminate because they
have these ingrained and invidious preferences.
30 Id. at p. 1039.
31 Id. at p. 1o36.
32 See GARY BECKER, THE ECONoMICs OF DISCRIMINATION 48-49 (2d ed. 197).
33 McAdams, supra note 9, at p. 1034.
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viewed as a whole, his wage demands are lower than those of his
snootier rival. In the end, therefore, the taste for discrimination will
be a liability and not an asset - unless one can show that this prefer-
ence provides some offsetting benefit that once again converts it into a
net asset.3
4
In addition, the Becker model does not make any strong prediction
that separation between races will be the norm. Rather, the precise
result is difficult to predict, because much will depend on the senti-
ments of the various workers and the number and distribution of
firms within the industry. Becker assumes that whites do not wish to
associate with blacks but that blacks do wish to associate with
whites.35 His stylized assumption is a useful means of exposition, but
it hardly presents an accurate reflection of the current employment sit-
uation (however plausible an account it might have been in 1957 when
Becker's book was first published). Today, the respectable calls for
separation seem to come more often from blacks than from whites.3 6
To make matters only more complicated, the intensity of the demand
for separation is not uniform within or across races. But it all hardly
matters. As long as the process is open, and choice is left available,
whatever level of mixing and separation emerges should be greeted
with approval, not suspicion.3 7 We do not possess theories of justice
strong enough to allow us to condemn outcomes as unfair when the
processes used to reach them are legitimate.
Once again it is important to note the limitations of the system: the
Becker model only deals with behavior under a purely competitive
system - indeed one that operates without the usual frictions associ-
ated with contracting in market contexts. In addition, the model does
not apply to cases in which force may be used to bar rivals from the
market. Once whites have the added power to keep blacks from leav-
ing the South, the model would no longer apply, for whites could then
adopt strategies to exploit the vulnerable position of blacks. But that
outcome is not possible in a market setting in which the exit option
constrains the behavior of the dominant group. If McAdams wishes to
explain how invidious segregation can prosper in market settings, he
cannot rely on behaviors in nonmarket settings, like the Jim Crow
South, to make his basic point. He must show how self-interested
market behavior in and of itself is capable of leading to socially unde-
sirable results.
34 See BECKER, supra note 32, at 39-53.
35 See id. at 31-32.
36 See Steven A. Holmes, N.A.A.C.P. Leader, Ousted by Board, Hints He Will Sue, N.Y.
TiMES, Aug. 21, 1994, at Ax, B7 (reporting that some NAACP officials believed Mr. Chavis was
moving the organization into a separatist posture).
37 See ROBERT NoziC, ANARCYrv, STATE, UTOPIA x68, 170-74 (1974) (noting that "patterned
principles" of justification constantly require the state to reassign entitlements otherwise obtained
through voluntary exchanges).
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In Forbidden Grounds, I examined the behavior of firms and indi-
viduals in competitive settings, as did Becker. In contrast to Becker,
however, I assumed that competition referred to a situation in which
many employers were bidding for the services of many employees.
Unlike Becker, I assumed that these markets were characterized by
various sorts of frictions that made contracting tricky even within the
competitive framework. This alternative model is, I think, more realis-
tic than the rather stylized market postulated by Becker. The fuller
model also raises a possibility that Becker discounted, namely that
some forms of racial discrimination could persist by allowing individ-
ual firms to prosper. Competition thus need not eradicate all forms of
discrimination, but the forms of discrimination that survived could be
regarded as "rational" because of their useful social consequences. 38
The concrete benefits of continued racial discrimination come from
two sources. First, firms provide various forms of limited public goods
for their workers. Any office has to have conventions about dress, de-
cor, and music that cover all its workers. These conventions bind all
group members even though outsiders are excluded. They thus create
limited public goods that are easier to supply as the homogeneity in
the tastes of group members increases. To the extent that these tastes
are correlated with membership in various racial, ethnic, and religious
groups, firms that cater to these preferences could well have higher
production at lower costs and hence would prosper in a market
setting.
Second, the enforcement of the terms of any employment contract
through legal mechanisms is both costly and imperfect. To compen-
sate, firms have to rely on informal social sanctions to keep affairs
running on an even keel. If some forms of discrimination will make it
easier to select these firm-specific public goods, or to enforce these em-
ployment contracts by informal means, racial discrimination will sur-
vive even in open and competitive markets. Yet by the same token,
discrimination will not lead to wage discrimination or to the disadvan-
tage of members of any racial group. The point is that market separa-
tion, unlike political separation, does not go hand in hand with the
personal domination that McAdams fears. The advantages of separa-
tion are gained not only by whites, but also by blacks and by other
ethnic groups as well. Accordingly, some forms of voluntary discrimi-
nation lead to uniformly higher wages and to uniformly higher levels
of worker satisfaction, hardly the making of a social crisis.3 9 In addi-
tion, it seems clear that these strategies of separation do not make
sense for all firms, even if firms seek to cater slavishly to the racial
preferences of their customer base. In some cases, these market prefer-
ences are likely to be insignificant. Thus, there is little reason to ex-
38 See EPSTEIN, supra note ii, at 59.
39 See id. at 45-46.
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pect discrimination in those businesses in which there is little customer
contact. This condition is satisfied, for example, in all sorts of manu-
facturing and production jobs. But even in consumer markets, one
would have to presuppose an astonishing uniformity of preference to
assume (especially in an age in which there is widespread political
support for the principles of diversity) that whites so prefer to deal
with each other that they will take active steps to shut qualified
blacks out of positions of influence and power. A moment's glance at
the advertisements in the New York Times or the Chronicle of Higher
Education should persuade even the most hardened skeptic of the ex-
plicit and enduring commitment of elite institutions to hiring minority
applicants. White-only associational preferences do not play a promi-
nent role in today's society; the movement in favor of diversity and
multiculturalism has steamrollered its opposition, which is couched in
color-blind terms.
It therefore seems odd in the current setting to stress that status
production promotes discrimination against blacks; in most cases sta-
tus production is used to promote blacks' interests. At best, one can
say that McAdams shows that the status-production mechanism might
enforce discrimination in certain limited areas. But even for this lim-
ited task, he has to make two additional points to clinch his argument:
that the mechanism he identifies is more important than the market
mechanisms I identified in Forbidden Grounds;40 and that even if the
role of status production is important, status production leads to em-
ployment outcomes that the state should prevent. I think that his first
point is at best dubious and that his second is clearly wrong.
B. Libertarian and Statist Visions of the Law
The larger mistake of McAdams's argument is that he does not
link Becker's analysis to a more systematic account of the legal regime
in which private actors behave. Many of his attacks - indeed too
many - are directed toward slaying the Jim Crow dragon, which is
an odd target indeed if his objection is to hiring strategies that are
available to all in competitive markets. Why use - and use con-
stantly - an example that is so far removed from the market institu-
tions that are the ostensible focus of examination? Indeed, the
constant references to Jim Crow can only be designed to create the
appearance of guilt by association. But ironically that charge is one
that has some force when directed toward McAdams's argument. For
while his motives are far more laudable than those of Jim Crow, he is
all too willing to use government coercion to achieve a desired social
end, an undertaking that a cautious libertarian would scrupulously
seek to avoid.
40 See supra p. iogi.
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To see the coercive end-state vision of the modern civil rights laws,
it is instructive to look at the structure of Title VII, which McAdams
ignores:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: (i) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms
or conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... .41
Even if Title VII were repealed tomorrow, the libertarian prohibitions
on force and fraud in the employment market, as elsewhere, would
remain. The repeal of Title VII would not give any individual the
powers that privileged persons routinely enjoyed under Jim Crow.
Private violence by anyone against anyone else would still be sternly
prohibited. In this context, an antidiscrimination norm does apply: all
persons are bound by that constraint, regardless of race, creed, or
color. And of course, nothing in this libertarian position allows some
privileged persons to determine other people's trading (or marriage)
partners, so the antimiscegenation laws are out as well. Jim Crow
presented no world that I would care to defend, but rather was a sick,
statist society that gave official vent to the worst and meanest
prejudices of all individuals. The very libertarian and market-based
theories that McAdams wishes to discredit reject Klan activities and
various forms of violence and abuse.
To compound the confusion, McAdams attacks private discrimina-
tion as though it were part and parcel of a larger collection of public
racist practices. He makes it appear that only his theory can respond
to actions driven by hostile racial motives. In fact, some of these acts
are illegal under theories that care little about motive and much about
aggressive, fraudulent, or monopolistic conduct. "Discrimination and
racist behavior generally are processes by which one racial group seeks
to produce esteem for itself by lowering the status of another group."42
This "race-neutral" version of the proposition makes it appear as
though all racial groups have equal resort to the same set of tech-
niques, without explaining why any dominant group could obtain
some systematic advantage from these techniques. But the success of
the technique depends upon the available tools, which are not evenly
distributed when one group controls the levers of power, as was the
case under Jim Crow. It is critical to pay special attention to the coer-
cive means that were used in that setting and to ask why any mem-
bers of a subordinate group would stick around and take abuse if they
were free to work elsewhere. Indeed, it is only within the context of a
Jim Crow setting that it is proper to invoke the work of George
Akerlof to show that a caste system may work to punish those who
41 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a) (ig8s).
42 McAdams, supra note 9, at p. 1044.
1995] 1o99
HeinOnline  -- 108 Harv. L. Rev 1099 1994-1995
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
flaunt its taboos. 43 McAdams's attack is well aimed if his desire is to
criticize large statist systems of social control under Jim Crow; his ar-
gument, however, is beside the point in any contemporary defense of
Title VII's mischievous interference with private competitive markets,
which are decidedly non-caste structures.44 Our dispute is not over
whether Jim Crow is just - we both agree that it isn't. The question
is whether any dominant social group could maintain its social domi-
nance in a modern setting solely by choosing its trading partners and
the terms and conditions on which they trade.
C. Can Status Deprivation Survive Without State Control or
Private Violence?
The history of Jim Crow raises a second issue on which I differ
sharply from my critics.45 My basic position in Forbidden Grounds
was that the entire apparatus of Jim Crow was supported by three
pillars: social and cultural norms, public force, and private violence.46
McAdams is careful not to claim that Jim Crow shunned the use of
private and public violence. He recognizes that violence was often
used.4 7 But he claims that his status-production theory shows that in-
vidious forms of discrimination could persist in other settings without
the coercion on which Jim Crow so heavily depended.48
Yet once again McAdams does not point to any modern system
that shuns the use of force and is able to maintain anything similar to
the caste-like structure of Jim Crow. Nor can we assume that status
production could have maintained Jim Crow without a handsome
boost from the use of force. Any social and cultural norms, however
embedded, would have failed the task of maintaining segregation, be-
cause they could not forestall the threat of entry by outsiders and exit
by locals. If whites and blacks from the North could move to the
South and offer positions to blacks, why would domestic servants have
chosen to remain in households that demeaned and degraded them?
The presence of new alternatives would induce the prior employers to
43 "It is the essence of a caste-system, Akerlof says, that 'any transaction that breaks the caste
taboos changes the subsequent behavior of uninvolved parties' who may act to punish the caste-
breaker." McAdams, supra note 9, at pp. io64-65.
44 For two very different views of the question of caste in contemporary settings, see Sunstein,
cited above in note io, at 2411-13.
45 See, e.g., J. Hoult Verkerke, Free To Search, io5 HARv. L. REV. 2o8o, 2o89-94 (1992) (re-
viewing EPSTEIN, supra note ii); Ian Ayres, Price and Prejudice, NEw REPuBLIC, July 6, 2992,
at 30, 31 (same).
46 See EPSTEIN, supra note iI, at 93-97.
47 See McAdams, supra note 9, at p. 1052 ("Thus, when black successes threatened white
status, whites used violence to defend their position and keep blacks in their place."). The only
exception that I take to this sentence is the word "status." Whites could and did use violence to
defend many of their interests that were threatened by blacks and not only the status interests
that McAdams discusses at length.
48 See id. at p. io55.
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mend their ways, or employees would seek more favorable circum-
stances. If only cultural norms were involved, employees could collec-
tively thumb their noses at their prior employers and could entice
other black workers to follow their lead. Black solidarity could help
facilitate their break from traditional discriminatory patterns without
fear of intimidation from racist sheriffs or vigilante bands.
In this connection it is useful to look at Heckman and Payner's
study on the South Carolina textile mills.49 Their data are remarkable
for revealing the consistently low percentage of blacks who worked in
the various textile mills between i91o and 1965.50 If that low percent-
age of blacks were found only within a single firm, the outcome could
be attributed to the segregationist or racist policy of its owner or of its
white employees. Yet the consistent figures are industry-wide: can we
really believe that, for a fifty-five year period, no one thought that
there were any gains to be made by coming into a market where
skilled black labor was largely untapped? By 1965, the percentage of
black workers in previously white firms started to increases ' due to
the federal government's protection of firms that hired black labor
from physical aggression. There was no magical or sudden transfor-
mation in social attitudes. Why then did status production lose its
power? Only because the coercive props were knocked out from
under it. Similar results occurred in the trucking industry. The pas-
sage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did little to increase black represen-
tation among drivers, but a much more robust response resulted when
reform legislation relaxed the preexisting barriers to entry into the
field.52
By appealing to the role of imperfect information and high transac-
tion costs, McAdams minimizes the enormous influence that entry and
exit can have on firm behavior. He thus argues that "assuming that
there are any parties who will boycott 'innovators' (those who violate
discriminatory norms), and that one cannot costlessly distinguish
boycotters from nonboycotters, the innovators necessarily incur higher
search costs in finding trading partners."5 3 "Market failures" of this
sort are a dime a dozen and worth precisely that. McAdams's analysis
assumes that boycotters keep their intentions secret, but normally they
proclaim their goals loudly to the world. The Arabs did not conceal
their boycott of firms that did business with the Israelis. Labor unions
49 See James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal Antidis-
crimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 Am. ECON.
REV. 138, 140-45 (1989). I have commented on this study at length in EPSTEIN, cited above in
note ii, at 244-54; and Epstein, cited above in note ii, at 43-44.
5o See Heckman & Payner, supra note 49, at 140-43.
51 See id.
52 See John S. Heywood & James H. Peoples, Deregulation and the Prevalence of Black Truck
Drivers, 37 J.L. & EcON. 133, 133-35 (1994).
S3 McAdams, supra note 9, at p. xo66.
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do not keep their secondary boycotts hidden. The Montgomery boy-
cott of the 195Os was not a well-kept secret. People who comply with
a boycott may keep their compliance a secret to avoid retaliation from
the other side, but the boycotters only make their case by going public
and getting third parties to join with them. To be sure, all boycotters
run the risk of retaliation, but what they gain in exchange is visibility
and solidarity, the very status-production goods that McAdams
emphasizes.
McAdams also overlooks the counter-strategies that an open mar-
ket offers to those who wish to do business with these innovators.
They can identify themselves publicly (without fear of coercive retalia-
tion) and thus reduce the costs that innovators incur in finding trading
partners. Of course, they can also boycott the boycotters, who there-
fore have to pay a heavy economic price to pursue a strategy that has
little likelihood of success. I see no reason to suppose that mere collec-
tive refusals to deal could have stopped the massive entry into the
South, and of course these tactics could have done absolutely nothing
to stop the mass exodus from the South that took place during the
first half of this century.54 What good does it do to refuse to deal with
those prospective employees who are already out the door?
Yet it should never be supposed that launching a boycott is itself a
riskless procedure. It is one thing to invoke the strategy and quite
another to make it work over the long haul, as evidenced by the well-
documented frustrations of the pure boycotter. One major unresolved
question of labor relations is the extent to which the activities of labor
picketers can be regulated or enjoined on the ground that they involve
an implicit (but very evident) threat of the use of force. The history of
labor law shows that the common law, the Constitution, and the labor
statutes all have struggled futilely to sort out protected speech from
unprotected force..5 During the past Term, the Supreme Court faced
the same conflict over free speech in connection with the picketing of
abortion clinics by Operation Rescue.5 6 All boycotters face (but need
not yield to) the temptation to use force, because they know that the
more peaceful means of persuasion may well fail.
The same point can be brought home by looking at the black boy-
cott of white merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi. The boycott
gave rise to extensive litigation, first in the Mississippi courts,5 7 and
then in the United States Supreme Court.58 From 1966 to 1972,
54 For a discussion of the level of black migration from the South to Chicago, see NICHOLAS
LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED
AMERICA 6 (ggi).
55 See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077, 1077 (Mass. x896).
56 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526, 2529 (1994).
57 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1293 (Miss. 198o), rev'd, 4S8
U.S. 886 (1982).
S8 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 888-89, 9i (1982).
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blacks conducted a boycott of white merchants in Claiborne County,
until the elected white officials of the county met their demands for
integration of the county police force and other county offices.59 The
boycott prompted a suit for tortious interference with business rela-
tions, and a Mississippi chancellor imposed a judgment in excess of a
million dollars jointly and severally on all the participants in the boy-
cott. The damage judgment was then backed up by a permanent in-
junction against the continuation of certain boycott practices. 60 In
reversing the judgment of the Mississippi courts, Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the Court, did not deny that the black boycotters used both
violence and vilification to deter black defection.61 Quite the opposite:
in my view, his opinion dubiously allowed the First Amendment to
shield the boycotters from the consequences of their own violence.
Why would the boycotters have had to resort to violence if vilification
alone could prevent defection from the grand coalition?
What was true of the NAACP in Claiborne Hardware was true as
well in the old South, in which the combination of public and private
actions restricted the actions of anyone who wished to deviate from
the dominant practices. No one denies that ostracism and contempt
were part of the overall strategy of social control, but always in tan-
dem with the public abuse of administrative power and the selective
use of private violence. Professor Kenneth Karst, no sympathizer of
my position, supports this thesis in his pre-revisionist account of Jim
Crow:
59 See id. at 898-900.
60 See Claiborne Hardware, 393 So. 2d at 1293.
61 Although Justice Stevens stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not protect violence," he
went on to observe that, when violence occurs "in the context of constitutionally protected activ-
ity," the presence of protected activity partially insulates some violent activities from legal sanc-
tion. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916.
According to Justice Stevens:
The opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court itself demonstrates that all business losses
were not proximately caused by the violence and threats of violence found to be present.
The court stated that "coercion, intimidation, and threats" formed "part of the boycott
activity" and "contributed to its almost complete success." The court broadly asserted -
without differentiation - that "'[i]ntimidation, threats, social ostracism, vilification, and
traduction'" were devices used by the defendants to effectuate the boycott. The court re-
peated the chancellor's finding that "the volition of many black persons was overcome out
of sheer fear." These findings are inconsistent with the court's imposition of all damages
"resulting from the boycott." To the extent that the court's judgment rests on the ground
that "many" black citizens were "intimidated" by "threats" of "social ostracism, vilification,
and traduction," it is flatly inconsistent with the First Amendment. The ambiguous find-
ings of the Mississippi Supreme Court are inadequate to assure the "precision of regula-
tion" demanded by that constitutional provision.
Id. at 921 (footnotes omitted).
Not the least of the ironies of Justice Stevens's opinion is that it appears to invalidate the
Civil Rights Act insofar as the Act is justified as a means to control "social ostracism, vilification,
and traduction." All of these behaviors are protected under the First Amendment for whites as
well as for blacks.
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Jim Crow illustrates the main technique of nativist domination: the en-
forced separation of members of the subordinate cultural group from a
wide range of public and private institutions that, in the aggregate, con-
stitute "society." Racial segregation in the American South was the suc-
cessor to slavery and the Black Codes, both of which had been decisively
made unlawful by congressional legislation and the Civil War amend-
ments. In this historical context it is easy to see Jim Crow for what it
was: a thoroughgoing program designed to maintain blacks as a group in
the position of a subordinate racial caste by means of a systematic denial
of belonging. Jim Crow laws extended from disenfranchisement to
prohibitions on interracial marriage and imposed racial segregation
everywhere: schools, courtrooms, buses, restaurants - indeed, all places
where people of both races otherwise might interact in public. Private
racial discrimination also played an important role in maintaining the
caste system, producing segregation in housing, employment, and public
accommodations, and leaving a legacy that, even today, remains only
partially remedied. Lynching was the system's ultimate weapon, and it
was by no means a wholly private enterprise.62
This use of force, both public and private, was often directed
against blacks who might have chosen to leave the old South - en-
ticement of labor was a crime in many states. 63 McAdams is right
about one point: if the sole goal were dissociation, the enthusiasts of
Jim Crow should have paid for the tickets. But he is wrong about
why dissociation was not their objective. They did not seek happiness
from a market economy in which they were equal players: they sought
still greater gains from their local dominance backed by state force
and private violence, which could only work so long as the victims
were kept close to home. No libertarian world here, so McAdams's
account adds nothing to condemnations that are already in place.
D. Status Production for All
McAdams fails to develop fully the point that any group can seek
to build group solidarity by appealing to group mission and group
identity. More specifically, McAdams cites the work of Dennis
Chong64 to the effect that a "non-material concern for reputation
served as a motivator in civil rights activities like the freedom rides,
the Montgomery bus boycott, the Selma voting drive, and the Greens-
62 Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L.
REV. 303, 321 (1986) (citations omitted).
63 See William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-194o: A Preliminary
Analysis, 42 J. S. HIST. 31, 33-36 (1976).
64 DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991).
Chong's work is discussed in McAdams, cited above in note 9, at notes 52-55 and accompanying
text.
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boro lunch counter sit-in."65 No one who has lived through the 195os
and i96os would want to deny the power of the rhetoric used in oppo-
sition to Jim Crow. It was the opponents, not the supporters, of Jim
Crow who sang "We shall overcome," who organized the marches, the
prayer meetings, the fund raising drives, the voter registration cam-
paigns, the pamphlets, and the support groups to keep their mission
going in the face of racial hostility. It was Rosa Parks who inspired
and Martin Luther King, Jr. who organized the boycotts of the bus
companies that maintained segregated seating. It was not the white
racists who borrowed the do-or-die rhetoric of Henry V; it was their
outmanned, politically marginalized, and physically vulnerable oppo-
nents. In fact, the rather pathetic propaganda counter-efforts by the
entrenched but morally bankrupt majority look feeble in comparison.
But once again details matter. When did the opposition resort to
these techniques to attack Jim Crow? The above list of stirring events
all took place after 954. That is, they took place after the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education66 showed that the might of the federal
government would align itself against the forces of Jim Crow. Before
that time what group would have wanted to face the unconstrained
fury of southern justice and private revenge? It was only when some
external - read "federal" - force began to neutralize the public and
private violence of the Jim Crow South that voluntary organizations
could speak out on such matters as voting and integration of lunch
counters or buses. Before that time no techniques of status production
emboldened fair-minded white southerners to speak out and march
against the practices of Jim Crow. The risks of force and retaliation
were far too great. And the same was true for southern blacks.
The lesson seems clear for the modern-day issues that McAdams
addresses. State coercion and private violence are no longer bars to
black aspirations in the labor markets. In this environment, the sta-
tus-production techniques are not only open to the small fraction of
whites who still cling to the old ideals of Jim Crow, but also to indi-
viduals of all races who reject such teachings. White groups that sup-
port integration or affirmative action can use status-production
techniques, as can the same black groups that fought so hard against
Jim Crow. Why, then, does the state have to give additional assist-
ance to the large array of groups that have adopted status-production
techniques to promote the antidiscrimination or affirmative action
goals that they champion? These new groups may not be able to
bring everyone along with them, but certainly they would not be snuf-
fed out or rendered powerless if the civil rights laws were repealed, so
65 McAdams, supra note 9, at p. xoI8 n.54. For an analysis of the rhetorical style of the civil
rights movement, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-41 (199I).
66 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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long as the prohibition against the misuse of public and private force
is scrupulously enforced.
McAdams, however, does not sufficiently explore the extent to
which these status-production mechanisms are available today to
groups of all races and persuasions. Instead, he tends to give these
devices greater weight in the hands of bigots. "[E]conomic analysis of
discrimination strikes many non-economists as barren because it fails
to acknowledge the full benefit to its practitioners .... [That benefit
is that] whites gain status by discriminating against blacks."6 But
once again he stops the analysis too quickly, for there is no particular
reason to assume that (some) whites have a built-in advantage in sta-
tus production. Nor should it be supposed that privileged whites are
better able to practice discrimination because of their higher social sta-
tus. People with such elevated status make obvious targets for ridicule
and contempt: after all, what possible reason save systematic social
corruption could account for such dubious characters' occupying
places at the top of the social hierarchy? Conversely, oftentimes the
bitterest resentment toward blacks comes from poor whites who think
that their own low-status position is evidence that they have been
passed over in the endless set of social reforms that have worked
against their interests. Resentments can be widespread, and anyone
who is resentful can take out his anger by words and deeds of
discrimination.
McAdams's argument also fails even if we confine our attention to
status production as a tool in overt political struggles. In these
charged settings, the techniques of status production make the opposi-
tion to race discrimination more tenacious, for the same general rea-
son, and for a better cause. Recall that the post-1964 boycott in
Claiborne Hardware started because of the cohesive social unity of
most blacks within the county, who were held together by church
groups and the NAACP. But as time wore on, the boycotters system-
atically resorted to threats of force and intimidation to prevent outsid-
ers or defectors from upsetting their plans.68 If McAdams were correct
about the power of status production, he could not explain why the
boycott organizers resorted to these strong-arm tactics between 1966
and 1972 when they were no longer an insulated minority. Yet a more
dispassionate explanation is not hard to find. The boycotters took
these steps because they were necessary to the success of the venture,
and they were successful because the use of force was ultimately toler-
ated by the transformed legal order in the post-1964 South.
But questions still remain. Can the civil rights movement today
organize itself as effectively when force, fraud, and monopoly cannot
67 McAdams, supra note 9, at pp. xo76-77.
68 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1297 (Miss. ig8o), rev'd, 4S8
U.S. 886 (1982).
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be raised up against it? Or is some moderate adversity needed to keep
the movement cohesive? The question is harder to answer than it first
appears. On the one hand, the costs of association clearly are far
lower; therefore, if the benefits were constant, we should expect to see
a larger number of groups opposed to discrimination, who use these
status-production techniques to organize. On the other hand, the ben-
efits from such organization shrink, because the most important
targets have already been taken, which leaves the next stage of the
civil rights agenda far more open to means-ends debates than the
agenda that preceded it.- It is difficult to see such esteem-producing
moral convictions' arising out of the redistributive game that the civil
rights laws have fostered.
E. The Contemporary Risks of Adopting a Status-Deprivation
Model
There is little reason to believe that an appreciation of the status-
production model requires an abandonment or modification of compet-
itive labor markets as contemplated by the civil rights laws. But it is
also important to note that there are grave risks in any effort to create
a government monopoly on matters of hiring, as the Civil Rights Act
does. Government power cannot be doled out in perfect measure.
Even if status-production functions should be countered by an antidis-
crimination ordinance, it is highly unlikely that the army of bureau-
crats and lawyers charged with the enforcement of the statute will
confine its operation to the laudable purposes that justify its use.
Rather, the far greater risk is that the new statists will emulate
some of the worst characteristics of the old Jim Crow regime. The
original civil rights statute may have been misguided in its aim, but at
least it was universal in its aspiration. It protected all individuals.
Yet almost without reflection, the Supreme Court has read the statute
to create protected classes against whom discrimination counts, and,
by implication, unprotected classes against whom discrimination can
be practiced with impunity. By a few deft judicial decisions, a univer-
sal statute has become a partisan regime that uses public force to en-
courage some forms of discrimination while banning others.69 I cannot
69 This is the combined effect of three great antidiscrimination cases of the i97os. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), first made it clear that proof of intent was not required
when discriminatory consequences resulted. See id. at 432. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), made it clear that disparate treatment under the Civil Rights Act applied
only to protected classes. See id. at 802. The transformation was made without note or fanfare.
The key passage reads as follows:
The compkainant in a Tfltle VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i)
that he belongs to a racial minority, (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which an employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that despite his qualifications, he was re-
jected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
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think of a single good argument that would allow the statute to ban
whatever affirmative action or diversity program a private firm wishes
to adopt, however shallow the firm's reasons or asocial its conse-
quences. But I also cannot think of a single good argument to build
formal distinctions between races into the fabric of the law, either by
initial statutory design or by judicial machinations such as the
designation of some groups as "protected classes." Nor can I under-
stand why government officials should countenance separation only by
blacks, or regulate integrated workforces by insisting that any devia-
tion from some predetermined goal or quota subjects a firm to costly
examination and potentially serious penalties. Is this really the appro-
priate response to the racial snubs and slights of private individuals?
Or do we have to recognize that the employment discrimination laws
reach only a tiny fraction of the antisocial behavior that McAdams
identifies, although these laws have an adverse impact on the opera-
tions of tens of thousands of lawful businesses in the United States? It
may be an empirical question whether we need to maintain the em-
ployment discrimination laws once the question of status production is
taken into account. But nothing suggests that this empirical question
is a close one.
The time has come to stop beating the dead horse of Jim Crow.
The issues of race relations in the United States today are far more
heavily influenced by the massive commitment to the Civil Rights
Acts of the last thirty years, and the failures of the current situation
cannot be laid at the doorstep of a set of odious practices that have
long since ceased to control our social lives. The blunt truth is that
the Civil Rights Acts have not and cannot increase economic prosper-
ity and racial harmony. The Civil Rights Acts have instead created a
drag on labor markets and compelled "good" discrimination whose
consequences are often as invidious as those of the forms of discrimi-
nation that they attack. Our best hope for the future is to remove
from employment markets all the shackles that have been so assidu-
ously built up since 1964 and to stop pretending that ostensibly benev-
olent forms of labor regulation can succeed although bad forms have
Id. at 802 (emphasis added). Note that the initial sentence applies to all complainants. Yet under
the first condition, only members of a "racial minority" may claim the benefit of the test. Under a
colorblind interpretation, any qualified person who is passed over should be able to take advan-
tage of this test, especially if the person ultimately hired was of a different race. United Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (979), completed the task by allowing voluntary race-conscious
affirmative action. See id. at 207-o8. Weber acted as though the earlier decisions in Griggs and
McDonnell Douglas operated in a different moral universe. But in practice the ex ante incentives
on employers are driven by the intersection of the three decisions. In following a colorblind strat-
egy, an employer risks being held liable under a disparate impact theory, even if its hiring deci-
sion were not influenced by any impermissible racial motive. In following an affirmative action
strategy, an employer avoids this powerful form of Title VII liability but runs little or no danger
of liability to those disappointed employees or applicants who are not members of a protected
class. The tilt induced by these asymmetrical payoffs seems clear.
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already failed. Professor McAdams's attempt to salvage the Civil
Rights Acts by an appeal to sophisticated but incomplete conceptions
of status production is a failure. And so are the Civil Rights Acts
whose continued existence he vainly seeks to justify.
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